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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the relationship between intellectual capital disclosure and 
corporate governance variables, controlling for other firm-specific characteristics, for a 
sample of 100 UK listed firms. Intellectual capital disclosure is measured by a disclosure 
index score, supported by word count and percentage of word count metrics to assess the 
variety, volume and focus of intellectual capital disclosure respectively. The independent 
variables comprise various forms of corporate governance structure: board composition, 
ownership structure, audit committee size and frequency of audit committee meetings, 
and CEO role duality. Results of the analysis based on the three measures of intellectual 
capital disclosure indicate significant association with all the governance factors except 
for role duality. The influence of corporate governance mechanisms on human, structural 
and relational capital disclosure, based on all three metrics, is also explored.  
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Intellectual capital disclosure and corporate governance structure in UK firms 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of corporate governance on 
intellectual capital disclosure in corporate annual reports, controlling for other firm 
characteristics. Intellectual capital is increasingly recognised as having much greater 
significance in creating and maintaining competitive advantage and shareholder value 
(Tayles et al., 2007). Definitions of intellectual capital vary (for example, Stewart, 1997; 
Mouritsen, 1998). One of the most comprehensive definitions of intellectual capital is 
offered by CIMA (2001): ‘…the possession of knowledge and experience, professional 
knowledge and skill, good relationships, and technological capacities, which when 
applied will give organisations competitive advantage.’ Sveiby (1997) suggests that the 
concept of intellectual capital can be categorised into human, structural and 
organisational capital, while Guthrie and Petty (2000) offer an alternative categorisation: 
internal structure, external structure and human capital. The various forms of intellectual 
capital disclosure are valuable information for investors as they help reduce uncertainty 
about future prospects and facilitate a more precise valuation of the company (Bukh, 
2003). However, financial reports fail to reflect such a wide range of value-creating 
intangible assets (Lev and Zarowin, 1999), giving rise to increasing information 
asymmetry between firms and users (Barth et al., 2001), and creating inefficiencies in the 
resource allocation process within capital markets.  
A number of research reports (e.g. FASB, 2001; ASB, 2007) and academic studies 
(e.g. Lev, 2001; Mouritsen et al., 2001) have called for greater disclosure of non-financial 
indicators of investment in intangible assets. Cañibano et al. (2000) argue that the cost 
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associated with a radical change in the accounting system to make it more value relevant 
for intellectual capital intensive firms is unaffordable and that the sensible approach 
towards the enhancement of financial reports is to encourage voluntary disclosure of 
intellectual capital information.  
Keenan and Aggestam (2001) argue that responsibility for the prudent investment of 
intellectual capital resides with corporate governance, and that, depending on the firm’s 
characteristics and orientation, the governance of publicly-owned firms may need to 
develop new structures and processes in annual reports for communicating information 
about the value created for stakeholders through the firm’s intellectual capital. However, 
as discussed in a later section, the empirical evidence from prior studies is limited, with 
small sample sizes prohibiting more rigorous statistical analysis and external validity. For 
example, we know very little about the main determinants of the variation in levels of 
intellectual capital disclosure in annual reports across firms, including the effects of good 
governance mechanisms.  
This paper examines the influence of corporate governance factors on intellectual 
capital disclosure, and the subcategories comprising it, using various disclosure measures. 
We hypothesise that significant relationships exist between intellectual capital disclosure 
in annual reports and board structure, role duality, ownership concentration, audit 
committee size and frequency of audit committee meetings, controlling for listing age, 
firm size and profitability. Using content analysis and regressing the three forms of 
intellectual capital disclosure measures on the explanatory variables, we find support for 
all hypotheses with the exception of role duality.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: the next section reviews the 
empirical literature on intellectual capital disclosure. The hypothesis development is 
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outlined in Section 3, followed by the research design in Section 4. Section 5 presents 
findings on intellectual capital disclosure practices from multiple regression analyses, and 
examines the working hypotheses. Finally, Section 6 discusses the findings, implications 
and limitations of the study.  
2. Literature on intellectual capital disclosure studies 
Information on intellectual capital is important to stakeholders in their decision 
making. Within an agency context, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that greater 
disclosure reduces the uncertainty facing investors and thus reduces a firm’s cost of 
capital. Managers should therefore be willing to disclose intellectual capital information 
in order to enhance the firm’s value by providing investors with a better assessment of the 
financial position of the firm and help reduce the volatility of stock returns. Barth et al. 
(2001) observe that analyst coverage is greater for firms investing more heavily in 
research and development and advertising, while empirical studies suggest a positive 
share price impact arises from specific intellectual capital indicators such as research and 
development expenditure (Amir and Lev, 1996), capitalisation of software development 
expenditure (Aboody and Lev, 1998), and customer satisfaction (Ittner and Larker, 1998).  
Gibbins et al. (1990) explore the voluntary disclosure process giving rise to disclosure 
outputs in response to internal and external stimuli. They argue that a company’s 
readiness to disclose is a function of its general disclosure position (for example, an 
uncritical adherence to information disclosure norms or to use disclosure as opportunity 
to gain advantage or boost stock price), antecedents (for example, corporate history, 
corporate strategy, and market factors), structure, and the use of consultants and advisors. 
While corporate governance mechanisms are not specifically identified, they have 
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relevance to all these independent variables, particularly to structure, where governance 
involves the establishing of clear policies.  
Abeysekera (2006) observes that the development of a theoretical framework 
underlying intellectual capital disclosure is in its infancy, with few studies providing a 
strong theoretical basis for interpreting their findings. However, the literature offers a few 
theoretical perspectives that may help explain the variation of intellectual capital 
disclosure. These include arguments based on legitimacy and stakeholders (Abeysekera 
and Guthrie, 2005), signalling (Garcia-Meca and Martinez, 2005), media agenda setting 
(Sujan and Abeysekera, 2007), agency (Patelli and Prencipe, 2007), and information 
asymmetry (Amir and Lev, 1996). 
In a review of the current state of financial and external reporting research, Parker 
(2007) identified intellectual capital accounting as a major area for further research.  
Most intellectual capital disclosure studies are cross-sectional and country specific. 
Examples include studies in Australia (e.g. Guthrie and Petty, 2000; Sujan and 
Abeysekera, 2007), Ireland (Brennan, 2001), Italy (e.g. Bozzolan et al., 2003), Malaysia 
(Goh and Lim, 2004), UK (e.g. Williams, 2001), and Canada (Bontis, 2003). Relatively 
few longitudinal studies have been reported (e.g. Abeysekera and Guthrie, 2005). Some 
studies focus on specific aspects of intellectual capital disclosure, such as human capital 
reporting (e.g. Subbarao and Zeghal, 1997), while others conduct international 
comparative studies (e.g. Vergauwen and Alem, 2005; Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 2007). 
Some intellectual capital disclosure studies have looked beyond annual reports to 
examine other communication channels such as analyst presentations (Garcia-Meca et al., 
2005). 
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Most intellectual capital disclosure studies employ content analysis as the research 
method, but some use questionnaire surveys (e.g. Bontis, 1998). Guthrie and Petty’s 
(2000) analysis of intellectual capital reporting practices suggests that disclosure has been 
expressed in discursive rather than numerical terms and that little attempt has been made 
to translate the rhetoric into measures that enable performance of various forms of 
intellectual capital to be evaluated. 
Studies have also been conducted to explore intellectual capital related issues from 
the firm’s perspective. Chaminade and Roberts (2003) investigate the implementation of 
intellectual capital reporting systems in Norway and Spain. Habersam and Piper (2003) 
employ case studies to explore the relevance and awareness of intellectual capital in 
hospitals. Studies that looked at possible determinants of voluntary intellectual capital 
disclosure include Garcia-Meca et al. (2005) and Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007). Based 
on analyst presentation reports of listed Spanish companies, Garcia-Meca et al. (2005) 
found significant association between intellectual capital disclosure and size and type of 
disclosure meeting but not ownership diffusion, international listing status, industry type 
and profitability. Based on analysis of European Biotechnology companies over a period 
of three years, Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) found governance related variables to 
strongly influence voluntary intellectual capital disclosure.  
In the UK, there has been a limited number of intellectual capital disclosure studies 
compared to its European counterparts. Williams (2001) conducted a cross-sectional 
study of 31 companies while Beattie et al. (2002) undertook a study of 11 companies in 
the food sector. The small sample sizes restrict generalisation and meaningful 
interpretation of intellectual capital disclosure. Roslender and Fincham (2004) explore 
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intellectual capital awareness among UK firms, and the reasons and motives underlying 
such interest.  
The foregoing discussion suggests that the literature on the determinants of 
intellectual capital disclosure is limited and inconclusive. Our study builds on the 
previous literature of intellectual capital disclosure practice within a UK context and 
examines its relationship with corporate governance structures, listing age, profitability 
and size. 
3. Determinants of intellectual capital disclosure and development of hypotheses  
Corporate governance mechanisms 
Corporate governance is a framework of legal, institutional, and cultural factors 
shaping the patterns of influence that stakeholders exert on managerial decision-making 
(Weimer and Pape, 1999). The justification for considering corporate governance is that 
the board of directors manages information disclosure in annual reports and therefore 
constituents of boards may be important. Holland (2006a: 147) found that boards of 
directors are at the heart of corporate financial communications, having active roles in the 
disclosure process related to 1) the provision of primary information regarding the 
corporate value-creation process, and their contribution towards it; 2) the provision of 
information about themselves in terms of their skills in managing the business; 3) the 
manner in which they are organised to conduct financial communications; 4) their 
reputation for disclosure honesty; and 5) information about how their own pay and wealth 
is tied to company fortunes. 
Agency theory provides a framework for linking voluntary disclosure behaviour to 
corporate governance, whereby control mechanisms are designed to reduce the agency 
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problem arising from the separation between ownership and management (Welker, 1995).  
This argument can be extended to intellectual capital disclosure, whereby management 
can determine the level of disclosure and thereby reduce investor uncertainty relating to 
the impact of intellectual capital on the firm’s value. High intellectual capital disclosure 
is therefore expected to provide a more intensive monitoring package for a firm to reduce 
opportunistic behaviour and information asymmetry.  
Adoption of internal control devices, such as audit committees and non-executive 
directors, and separation of the roles of chairman and chief executive, may enhance 
monitoring quality in critical decisions about intellectual capital investment and 
performance (Keenan and Aggestam, 2001). This is likely to reduce the scope for 
managerial opportunism and reduce benefits from withholding information, and, as a 
consequence, intellectual capital disclosure in annual reports should be improved. 
 
Board composition - proportion of independent non-executive directors (INED) 
The board of directors is an internal control mechanism intended to take decisions on 
behalf of the shareholders and to ensure that management behaviour is consistent with 
owners’ interests. Based on resource dependence theory, Haniffa and Cooke (2005) argue 
for more non-executive directors on the board as they can provide wider expertise, 
prestige and contacts, and play a key role in influencing disclosure. Extending this 
argument, and that of Gibbins et al. (1990), to intellectual capital, we suggest that the 
wider expertise and experience of non-executive directors on the board will encourage 
management to take a disclosure position beyond a ritualistic, uncritical adherence to 
prescribed norms, to a more proactive position reflecting the value relevance of 
intellectual capital to stakeholders.  
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Findings from prior  voluntary disclosure studies that considered board composition 
as a possible determinant of voluntary disclosure are mixed; some find that the proportion 
of non-executive directors is positively related with the board’s ability to influence 
voluntary disclosure decisions (e.g. Beasley, 1996; Chen and Jaggi, 2000), others find no 
relationship (Ho and Wong, 2001; Brammer and Pavelin, 2006), and yet others observe a 
negative relationship (Eng and Mak, 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005). One reason may be 
that non-executive directors are not necessarily independent. Independent non-executive 
directors are typically individuals with relevant expertise and professional reputations to 
defend, with no management role or links with the company
1
. Cotter and Silvester (2003) 
argue that independent non-executive directors are in a better position to monitor 
executive management. In one of the few studies capturing independent non-executive 
directors, Patelli and Prencipe (2007) found a positive correlation with the amount of 
voluntary information disclosed by companies in their annual reports. We also capture 
independent non-executive directors (INED) and argue that:  
H1: There is a positive relationship between the level of intellectual capital disclosure 
and the proportion of independent non-executive directors to the total number of 
directors on the board, ceteris paribus. 
Role duality (RDUAL) 
Another way to examine independence of the board is to consider role duality, a 
board leadership structure in which the same person undertakes both the roles of chief 
                                                 
1 The revised Combined Code (2006) recommends that at least half of the board, excluding the chairman, should comprise non-
executive directors determined by the board to be independent as defined by criteria in the Code, in order that non-executive directors 
are able to discharge their responsibilities in an objective manner, without interference, bias or favouritism. For example, a director 
should not have been an employee of the group within the last five years, had a material business relationship with the company within 
the last three years,  received additional remuneration from the company apart from a director’s fee, participate in the company’s share 
option or a performance-related pay scheme, close family ties with any of the company’s advisers, directors or senior employees, hold 
cross-directorships or significant links with directors,  or  serviced on the board for more than nine years.  
 10 
executive and chairman.
2
 There is widespread acknowledgement that a dominant 
personality commanding a firm may be detrimental to the interests of shareholders, and 
this phenomenon has been found to be associated with poor disclosure (Forker, 1992) and 
CEO entrenchment, resulting in ineffective monitoring of managerial opportunistic 
behaviour (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Concentration of decision-making power resulting 
from role duality could impair the board’s oversight and governance roles, including 
disclosure policies. Separation of the two roles provides the essential checks and balances 
on management behaviour (Blackburn, 1994), as recommended in the revised Combined 
Code (2006).
3
 Employing similar arguments for role duality as for independent non-
executives, we hypothesise that: 
H2: There is a negative relationship between the level of intellectual capital disclosure 
and role duality, ceteris paribus. 
Ownership structure – share concentration (SCON) 
The power of stakeholders to influence management is a function of the resources 
they control that are essential to the corporation (Smith et al., 2005). Ownership structure 
therefore will influence the level of monitoring and thereby the level of voluntary 
disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003). Agency theory argues that with greater ownership 
diffusion, firms are more likely to experience pressure from shareholders for greater 
disclosure to reduce agency costs and information asymmetry (Raffournier, 1995). In 
contrast, firms with closely-held ownership are expected to have less information 
asymmetry between management and dominant shareholders who typically have access 
                                                 
2  Role duality is not common among listed companies since the majority comply with the recommended code of corporate governance. 
3 However, in voluntary disclosure studies, Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Ho and Wong (2001) failed to find any relationship 
between the extent of voluntary disclosure and role duality. 
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to the information they need and can provide an active governance system that is difficult 
for smaller, more passive and less-informed investors (Cormier et al., 2005).
4
 This is 
particularly relevant to intellectual capital disclosure because fund managers have access 
to such information via private communication channels (Holland, 2006b). Hence, we 
hypothesise that: 
H3: There is a negative relationship between the level of intellectual capital disclosure 
and concentrated share ownership, ceteris paribus.  
Audit committee size (SAC) and frequency of meetings (MAC) 
Board monitoring is a function of not only the structure and composition of the board, 
but also of the board’s subcommittees where much of the important processes and 
decisions are monitored and taken (Cotter and Silvester, 2003). The role of audit 
committees has developed over the years to meet the challenges of changing business, 
social and economic environments. The Smith Report (2003) in the UK identifies the role 
of audit committees as ensuring that the interests of shareholders are properly protected in 
relation to financial reporting and internal control. It further recommends audit 
committees to review the significant financial reporting issues and judgments made in 
connection with the preparation of the company’s financial statements, interim reports, 
preliminary announcements and related formal statements, such as the operating and 
financial review and the release of price sensitive information. As such, audit committees 
can be expected to have a significant impact on value-relevant information disclosure, of 
which intellectual capital forms a large element in many firms.  
                                                 
4 However, prior disclosure studies provide mixed evidence. Cormier et al. (2005) and Brammer and Pavelin (2006) find significant 
negative associations between ownership concentration and engagement in environmental reporting practices. Patelli and Prencipe 
(2007) find a positive relationship between share ownership diffusion and voluntary disclosure. However, Eng and Mak (2003) fail to 
find any significant association between blockholder ownership and voluntary disclosure. 
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Effective audit committees should improve internal control and act as a means of 
attenuating agency costs (Ho and Wong, 2001), and as a powerful monitoring device for 
improving value-relevant intellectual capital disclosure. The presence of an audit 
committee has been found to be associated with more reliable financial reporting 
(McMullen, 1996), enhanced quality and increased disclosure (Ho and Wong, 2001). 
However, Mangena and Pike (2005) find no relationship between audit committee size 
and the extent of voluntary disclosure in interim reports. Inactive audit committees are 
unlikely to monitor management effectively and adequate meeting time should be 
devoted to the consideration of major issues (Olson, 1999). Price Waterhouse (1993) 
recommended that audit committees should hold a minimum of three or four meetings a 
year and special meetings when necessary. 
Given the increasing importance of intellectual capital, we expect larger audit 
committees, meeting more frequently, to have greater influence in overseeing intellectual 
capital disclosure practice. Therefore, our next two hypotheses are as follows: 
H4: There is a positive relationship between the level of intellectual capital disclosure 
and audit committee size, ceteris paribus. 
H5: There is a positive relationship between the level of intellectual capital disclosure 
and frequency of audit committee meetings, ceteris paribus. 
Control variables 
The length of time a company has been listed on a capital market (AGE) may be 
relevant in explaining the variation of disclosures. Younger listed companies without an 
established shareholder base are expected to be more reliant on external fund raising than 
more mature companies (Barnes and Walker, 2006) and have greater need to reduce 
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scepticism and boost investor confidence (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Hence, we expect a 
negative relationship between age of listed firms and level of intellectual capital 
disclosure. Profitability (ROA) may be the result of continuous investment in intellectual 
capital and firms may engage in higher disclosure of such information to signal the 
significance of their decision in investing in it for long-term growth in the value of the 
firm. We therefore expect a positive relationship between profitability and level of 
intellectual capital disclosure. Large firms are more visible and more likely to meet 
investors’ demand for information and we expect a positive relationship between size of 
company (SA) and level of intellectual capital disclosure. 
 
4. Research method 
4.1. Sampling design  
This study examines intellectual capital disclosure in corporate annual reports of UK 
fully listed companies on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) for financial year-ends 
between March 2004 and February 2005. Firms in seven industry sectors containing high 
intellectual capital companies (Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology, IT, 
Telecommunications, Business Support Services, Media & Publishing, Banking & 
Insurance, and Food Production & Beverage) were selected
5
. This provided us with a 
population size of 319 companies, from which a sample size of 100 was selected (31%). 
As the number of companies in each industry group is not the same, proportionate 
stratified sampling was applied (Moser and Kalton, 1996).  
 
                                                 
5 Given the bias towards high intellectual capital industry sectors, the sample cannot claim to represent the intellectual 
capital disclosure practice of all LSE listed UK firms. 
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4.2. Development of the research instrument  
Content analysis was used to collect the necessary data. An essential element of 
content analysis is the selection and development of categories into which content units 
can be classified. Various authors (e.g. Sveiby, 1997; Meritum, 2002) suggest that 
intellectual capital can be grouped into in three subcategories: (1) Human capital, for 
example, staff education, training, experience, knowledge and skills, (2) Structural capital, 
covering internal structures such as R&D, patents, management processes, and (3) 
Relational capital, covering external relationships such as customer relations, brands and 
reputation. These forms of intellectual capital can be leveraged to create competitive 
advantage and value for stakeholders. However, Beattie and Thomson (2007) observe 
that there is no consensus or precise definition of the constituents of such categories, 
giving rise to difficulties for annual report preparers and researchers seeking to quantify 
intellectual capital disclosure. Habersam and Piper (2003) argue for a comprehensive 
representation of intellectual capital, including metric and non-metric forms, in order to 
better discern its different dimensions and degrees of transparency. They further suggest a 
fourth intellectual capital category, namely ‘Connectivity Capital’ linking the other three 
forms. 
The categories and items in our research instrument were drawn from previous 
literature on intellectual capital definition and classification. The majority of previous 
intellectual capital disclosure studies have adopted or adapted Sveiby’s (1997) 
intellectual capital framework, which typically contains 22-25 items (Beattie and 
Thomson, 2007). The problem with too few coding categories is that it potentially 
increases the likelihood of random agreement in coding decisions and subsequently 
results in an overestimation of reliability (Milne and Adler, 1999). Similarly, higher 
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numbers of items in the instrument increase the complexity (Beattie and Thomson, 2007) 
and may potentially increase coding errors (i.e. reliability) (Milne and Adler, 1999). 
However, in order to achieve greater variation and better understanding of intellectual 
capital disclosure, we devised a more detailed checklist covering items relating to the 
three themes: human capital (HIC), structural capital (SIC) and relational capital (RIC), 
capturing information in the forms of text, numerical and graphical/pictorial. While 
Guthrie and Petty (2000) highlight the difficulty in seeking to quantify the qualitative 
aspects of intellectual capital, evidence from Habersam and Piper (2003) questions this 
view. All items in the designed research instrument were considered equally applicable 
and therefore equally capable of disclosure across all sample firms in all three formats.  
The initial draft of the research instrument with 150 items was pilot tested by one 
researcher, using a sample of annual reports (not included in the final sample). Based on 
feedback from the pilot test and discussion with two other researchers, the instrument was 
further modified to ensure that it captured the necessary and desired information for 
which it was designed. The research instrument was reduced to 61 intellectual capital 
items in three forms. The operational definitions and coding rules (see Appendix 1) were 
defined by one researcher and checked and agreed by the other two researchers.  
Measurement of dependent variables 
Beattie and Thomson (2007) argue that many of the content analysis research 
methods adopted in prior studies for intellectual capital disclosure measurement lack 
transparency, specificity, uniformity and rigour, and that these deficiencies may give rise 
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to misleading evidence. In this study, scoring of the research instrument was performed 
manually covering the whole annual report
6
.  
The dependent variable, intellectual capital disclosure, is measured using three 
different metrics: disclosure index (ICDI) to indicate the variety; word count (ICWC) to 
represent the volume; and word count as a percentage of annual report total word count 
(ICWC%) to indicate focus in the annual report. Our approach in scoring the items in the 
research instrument for the purpose of the disclosure index is essentially dichotomous in 
that an item scores one if disclosed and zero, if it is not.
7
. The intellectual capital 
disclosure index ICDIj for each company is calculated based on the disclosure index 
score formula used in Haniffa and Cooke (2005) as follows: 
j
n
t
ij
j
n
X
ICDI
j

 1  
where nj = number of items for j
th
 firm, nj = 183 (i.e. 61 items in three formats), 
Xij = 1 if i
th
 item disclosed, 0 if i
th
 item not disclosed, 
so that 0 ≤ ICDIj ≤ 1. 
The use of a dichotomous procedure in scoring the instrument for the disclosure index 
can be criticised because it treats disclosure of one item (regardless of its form or content) 
as being equal, and does not indicate how much emphasis is given to a particular content 
category. To capture the volume of intellectual capital content and to partly overcome the 
                                                 
6 Three coders independently coded the same four annual reports and Krippendorff’s (1980) alpha was used to test for reliability as 
it can account for chance agreement among multiple coders. The independent scores were all above the minimum 80% threshold for 
content analysis to be considered reliable (Riffe et al., 2005) and this was achieved after a second round of independently coding 
another four annual reports. Only one researcher completed the coding for the remaining ninety-two annual reports. To aid consistency 
of scoring, the research instrument was completed by one researcher, and to increase reliability of measurement, rescoring was done 
on a random selection of 10 firms three months after initial analysis, which confirmed over 90 percent consistent identification of 
content in the annual reports.  
7 Many prior intellectual capital disclosure studies have adopted the dichotomous (0:1) coding scheme in measuring intellectual capital 
disclosure, which is mainly for examining the presence/absence of intellectual capital items (e.g. Guthrie and Petty, 2000; Brennan, 
2001).  Some intellectual capital disclosure studies used weighted coding schemes, which give uneven scores for quantitative and 
qualitative information (e.g. Bozzolan, et al., 2003; Sujan and Abeysekera, 2007). Consistent with Cooke (1989), items were not 
weighted because of potential scoring bias and scaling problems. 
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problem of using an index score, this study introduces another form of measure, namely 
intellectual capital word count (ICWC). Words are the smallest unit of measurement for 
analysis and can be expected to provide the maximum robustness to the study in 
assessing the quantity of disclosure (Zeghal and Ahmed, 1990). Using the same research 
instrument, and taking ‘phrases’, or what Beattie and Thomson (2007) term ‘pieces of 
information’ as the basis of coding, the number of words relating to each intellectual 
capital item in the checklist was counted and added together to arrive at ICWC for each 
company. Graphical and pictorial messages were excluded from the word count measure
8
. 
Coding under ‘phrases’ and word count avoids the problem of coding sentences in 
terms of decisions over dominant themes, and the ‘phrases’ remain meaningful in their 
own right, while enabling the measuring of the amount of information provided. Coding 
annual reports into ‘phrases’ is a three-stage process involving 1) selection of sentences 
containing intellectual capital information; 2) splitting such sentences into ‘phrases’ and 
selecting only those relating to intellectual capital; and 3) coding ‘phrases’ under each 
relevant item(s) in the research instrument. Where a ‘phrase’ relates to more than one 
item in the checklist and cannot be split, it is then coded under all the related items and 
the word count is evenly distributed across all the items coded. An example is shown as 
follows,  
“The trust and confidence of all our stakeholders, together with our reputation, are 
among our most valuable assets.” (AstraZeneca plc 2004 Annual report). 
The sentence was split into three ‘phrases’: (1) The trust and confidence of all our 
stakeholders, (2) together with our reputation, (3) are among our most valuable asset. 
                                                 
8 Beattie and Thomson (2007) identify the problems with word count (such as print size, colour, font variations and disclosures in 
graphs/pictures format), and propose a measure addressing the differentiation in length and number of sentences used in expressing 
similar meanings encountered by coding sentences.  
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Phrase 1 was coded under ‘relationship with stakeholders’, phrase 2 was coded under 
‘company reputation’ and phrase 3 was equally distributed between the two items.  
Krippendorff (1980) further notes that words are a preferred measure when it is 
intended to measure the amount of total space devoted to a topic and to ascertain the 
importance of that topic. Although word count is not assumed to be representative of the 
quality of disclosure, it is assumed to be indicative of the overall responsiveness by 
corporate management
9
. The greater the number of words related to intellectual capital 
being disclosed in relation to the total number of words in the annual reports, the greater 
the emphasis given by management on intellectual capital information. Hence, we 
introduced a third measure, ICWC%, which is the proportion of intellectual capital word 
count to the total word count of the whole annual report. This measure captures the 
intellectual capital focus in the annual report. For example, a firm with a short annual 
report may have a low ICDI and ICWC but a high ICWC%, conveying to the reader the 
importance placed by management on intellectual capital information. 
Measurement of independent variables 
The independent variables are categorised into two groups: corporate governance and 
control variables. Data are drawn from corporate annual reports and Thomson Research. 
Table 1 summarises the operationalisation of both independent and dependent variables. 
[Table 1 insert here] 
4.3. Data analysis 
Multiple regression is used to test the relationship between intellectual capital 
                                                 
9 This assumption is based on the belief that management has editorial control of content when a large number of demands for 
inclusion of information are likely to exist. Annual reports are time consuming and costly to produce, and management must 
rationalise the competing demands for space. As a result space must be allocated on the basis of some perception of the importance of 
information to report users. 
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disclosure (based on each of the three measures) and the various corporate governance 
and control variables. To identify potential multicollinearity problems, the correlations 
between independent variables were reviewed and the variance inflation factors (VIF) 
computed. In addition, tests were conducted for normality (based on skewness and 
kurtosis) and Kolmogorov-Smirnov Lilliefors (for goodness of fit) for all dependent and 
continuous independent variables and when normality was a problem, the data was 
transformed
10
. An analysis of residuals, plots of the studentised residuals against 
predicted values as well as the Q-Q plot were conducted to test for homoscedasticity, 
linearity and normality assumptions. The regression equation is as follows: 
ICD = β0 + β1 INEDi + β2 RDUALi + β3 SqSCONi + β4 SACi + β5 MACi + β6 LnAGEi + 
β7 ROAi + β8 LnSAi + εi 
Where, ICD    =    Intellectual Capital Disclosure index (ICDI), Log of Intellectual Capital 
Disclosure word count (LnICWC), or Intellectual Capital Disclosure 
word count percentage (ICWC%); 
INED   =    Proportion of independent non-executive directors on board (proxy for 
board composition, %); 
RDUAL  =    1 if the roles of chairman and CEO are held by the same person; 0 if   
otherwise; 
SqSCON =    Square root of cumulative shareholding by significant shareholders 
(i.e. shareholders holding more than 3% of total shares outstanding 
to total shares outstanding (%);   
SAC       =     Audit committee size (total number of directors on the audit 
committee) (proxy for internal auditing function); 
MAC      =    Frequency of audit committee meetings (total number of audit 
                                                 
10 The standard tests for skewness and kurtosis revealed that share concentration, listing age and firm size were not normally 
distributed. Appropriate transformations were conducted to ensure data normality. Listing age and firm size were transformed using 
logarithmic transformation, whereas square root transformation was more effective for share concentration. 
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committee meetings held within the year to its financial year end) 
(proxy for internal auditing function); 
AGE       =    Log of length of listing on LSE (listing age) 
ROA       =    Return on assets (proxy for firm performance: profitability) 
LnSA      =    Log of sales (proxy for firm size); 
β = parameters; 
εi = error term; and 
i = the ith observation 
 
Table 2 presents the correlation and partial correlation matrices (controlling for log of 
sales, a proxy for size)
11
. 
[Table 2 insert here] 
It can be seen from both panel A and B of Table 2 that all variables showed 
significance for at least one intellectual capital disclosure measure. Table 2 panel A 
reveals that, with the exception of log of firm size, independent variable associations are 
all below 0.30.  The VIFs for each independent variable (shown in Table 6) are all less 
than 2, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a problem
12
. Panel B of Table 2 reveals no 
multicollinearity among explanatory variables after controlling for size. It can also be 
seen from panel B of Table 2 that board composition (INED) shows significant 
association with all measures of intellectual capital disclosure. Size of audit committee 
(SAC), frequency of audit committee meetings (MAC), and share concentration 
(SqSCON), show highly significant (1% and 5% levels) association with ICDI and log of 
ICWC, but not with ICWC%. Return on assets (ROA) and log of listing age (LnAGE) 
                                                 
11 Due to the significant effect of size on disclosure, the partial correlation (controlling for size) was considered to be more appropriate 
for identifying the marginal effects of other factors that were significantly correlated to level of intellectual capital disclosure.  
12 Previous authors suggest multicollinearity becomes a serious problem where correlations exceed 0.8 or VIFs exceed 10 (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2005). Further, the condition indexes, using eigenvalues of the independent variables correlation matrix, were also acceptable 
with all being below 20.  
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show significant correlation with ICDI and ICWC% respectively, at the 5% level.  
5. Results 
5.1 Descriptive analysis of intellectual capital disclosure 
Table 3 presents the results of the descriptive analysis of intellectual capital 
disclosure by each of the 61 items in the checklist under three categories in various 
formats. The most frequently disclosed human capital items in text form are number of 
employees, employee motivation, work-related competence, and other employee features. 
Other commonly disclosed human capital items include employee relationship, 
entrepreneurial spirit, development and training, work-related knowledge, employee age, 
equality, relation, skills, and commitment. Human capital items least disclosed are 
vocational qualifications, employee productivity and flexibility. In all three formats, the 
most disclosed structural capital items are business process, technology, research & 
development, management philosophy, overall infrastructure and distribution network. 
The strategic importance of customer and supply chain relationships in intellectual capital 
disclosure is evidenced by the most disclosed items being customers, relationship with 
suppliers and stakeholders, market presence, customer relationships and market 
leadership, with over 90% of sampled firms having disclosures of such items. 
[Table 3 insert here] 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive statistics of each measure of intellectual capital disclosure, at both overall 
and subcategory levels, and the independent variables for the sample companies are 
shown in Table 4. 
[Table 4 insert here] 
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The mean index (ICDI) is 0.36 with slight variation in the extent of human, structural 
and relational capital disclosure, and the mean aggregate word count (ICWC) is 10,488 
words, accounting for 26.3% of the overall annual report word count (ICWC%). ICDI 
ranges from 0.16 to 0.56; ICWC ranges from 1,234 to 51,430 words and ICWC% ranges 
from 8.9% to 42.6%.
13
  
The rankings of means for human, structural and relational capital disclosure change 
according to the disclosure measure employed. Structural capital ranks highest (37%) for 
the disclosure index score, relational capital ranks highest in terms of word count, while 
structural and relational are joint highest for focus, each forming 9% of the total annual 
report word count. In all cases, human capital is in third place, although not far behind the 
other two. The relational-structural-human ranking for word count (38%, 34% and 28% 
of total intellectual capital respectively) is consistent with findings from prior intellectual 
capital disclosure studies (e.g. Guthrie and Petty, 2000; Bozzolan et al., 2003; Goh and 
Lim, 2004; Vandemaele et al., 2005), demonstrating systematic differences in the level of 
reporting on intellectual capital elements. If firms focus on the disclosure of those 
intellectual capital elements that are most value and stakeholder relevant (Vergauwen et 
al., 2007), relational capital would seem to be most important in this regard. 
The means of corporate governance variables for sample firms indicate that less than 
half of the board in our sample consists of independent non-executive directors (INED). 
The mean for the cumulative significant shareholdings (excluding significant directors’ 
shareholding) is 30%. The majority (86%) have three or more directors in the audit 
committee, suggesting compliance with recommended best practice. In addition, the 
median for the audit committee meeting frequency is four times per year, with 83% of 
                                                 
13 Given that previous studies have adopted different research instruments, it is not possible to make meaningful comparison.  
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sample companies meeting three or more times during the financial year, in line with the 
Price Waterhouse (1993) recommendation.  
The results for intellectual capital disclosure by the three formats (text, number, 
graph/picture) are shown in Table 5. It can be seen that human, structural and relational 
capitals are disclosed in all three forms in the sample annual reports. Only for structural 
capital in text form do we observe all possible items disclosed. On average, 43 (70%) of 
the 61 intellectual capital items in the research instrument have text disclosures. This falls 
to 29% disclosure in numerical form, and 8% in graph/picture form, although one firm 
had one-third of its intellectual capital disclosure in graph/picture form.  
[Table 5 insert here] 
Our results confirm that intellectual capital disclosures are still mainly in text form, in 
line with previous studies (e.g. Guthrie and Petty, 2000; Brennan, 2001). The extensive 
use of numerical information in intellectual capital disclosure identified in the study is 
encouraging, supporting the finding of Sujan and Abeysekera (2007).  
5.3 Regression results 
Table 6 summarises the multiple regression results for all three intellectual capital 
disclosure measures.  
[Table 6 insert here] 
The first panel reports the multiple regression results for the ICDI model, producing 
an adjusted R
2
 of 62%. With the exception of role duality (RDUAL), all corporate 
governance factors examined are significant: size of audit committee (SAC) at the 1% 
level, and board composition (INED), frequency of audit committee meetings (MAC) and 
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square root of share concentration (SqSCON) at the 5% level. Firm size (LnSA) is 
significant at the 1% level. Results also show positive relationship between ROA and 
ICDI, while log of listing age (LnAGE) is negatively associated, both significant at the 
5% level. 
The second panel reveals that the log of ICWC (LnICWC) regression model, with an 
adjusted R
2
 of 67%, yields even stronger associations than the ICDI model. Results show 
highly significant (1% level) relationships between LnICWC and four of the five 
corporate governance factors examined, i.e. INED, SAC, MAC and SqSCON. However, 
unlike the ICDI model, ROA and LnAGE are not significant. LnSA is still significant at 
the 1% level.  
The explanatory power of the ICWC% model is weaker (adjusted R
2
 of 11.2%), as 
shown in the third panel. INED and LnAGE show significant associations at the 5% level, 
with SqSCON showing a weak relationship (10% level). All other corporate governance 
factors are insignificant, but in the direction predicted. Neither LnSA nor ROA is related 
to ICWC%.  
Table 7 presents a summary of multiple regression results for each of the three 
intellectual capital subcategories based on the word count metric: LnHICWC (log of 
human intellectual capital word count); LnSICWC (log of structural intellectual capital 
word count); and LnRICWC (log of relational intellectual capital word count)
14
.   
[Table 7 insert here] 
We observe that the two audit committee variables (SAC and MAC) are significantly 
associated with all three intellectual capital subcategories, confirming our hypothesis of 
                                                 
14 The ICDI models for each of the three intellectual capital subcategories reveals broadly similar associations and are not therefore 
presented. 
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the role these committees play in influencing the level of intellectual capital disclosure in 
its various forms. In addition, relational capital disclosures are significantly associated 
with independent non-executive directors (INED) and share concentration (SqSCON); 
structural capital disclosures are significantly associated with INED, while human capital 
disclosures are associated with role duality (RDUAL), all in the direction hypothesised.  
 
5.4 Examination of hypotheses  
Table 8 summarises the associations between the independent variables and 
intellectual capital disclosure measures, namely, variety (ICDI), volume (ICWC) and 
focus (ICWC%). 
[Table 8 insert here] 
Board composition was expected to be one of the major corporate governance 
determinants for intellectual capital disclosure. The significant positive results of all three 
measures of intellectual capital disclosure, especially for variety (5% level) and volume 
(1% level), support our hypothesis (H1) that the greater the presence of independent non-
executive directors on the board, the greater the intellectual capital disclosure. Detailed 
analysis at item level (not included) reveals that firms with more independent non-
executive directors disclose significantly more human capital items (e.g. employee 
relations and work-related competence, but not diversity or equality), structural capital 
items (e.g. management philosophy, corporate culture, innovation, knowledge-based 
infrastructure, and quality management and improvement), and relational capital items 
(e.g. market presence, relationships with suppliers, business agreements, and marketing 
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issues). They offer support to arguments based on both agency and resource dependence 
theories. 
Role duality was not found to influence intellectual capital and our hypothesis (H2) 
was rejected. Share ownership concentration showed significant negative associations 
with all three measures of intellectual capital disclosure as hypothesised, especially by 
variety (5% level) and volume (1% level). The finding supports our hypothesis (H3) that 
companies with more concentrated share ownership are less responsive to investors’ 
information costs, since the dominant shareholders typically have regular access to the 
information they require and hence there is less pressure for intellectual capital disclosure 
in annual reports. Analysis at intellectual capital subcategory level reveals that the impact 
of block shareholders is mainly on the volume of relational capital disclosure (e.g. 
customers, market presence and leadership, customer relationship and acquisition, 
company awards, public relation, distribution channel, relationship with suppliers and 
stakeholders, business collaboration and marketing). 
Audit committee size is found to be positively associated with ICDI and LnICWC, 
supporting our hypothesis (H4) that larger audit committees tend to provide greater 
intellectual capital disclosure in their annual reports. This is in line with the 
recommendations of the Smith Report (2003) that audit committees have responsibility to 
oversee documents such as the operating financial review. This document typically has a 
strong intellectual capital disclosure emphasis. Results support hypothesis (H5) that a 
positive relationship exists between level of intellectual capital disclosure and frequency 
of audit committee meetings. This suggests that audit committee activity is an important 
factor in monitoring management behaviour with regard to reducing information 
asymmetry through intellectual capital disclosure.  
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6. Summary and conclusions 
Results based on multiple regression models for the three intellectual capital 
disclosure measures indicate that, with the exception of role duality, all corporate 
governance variables together with firm size, profitability and listing age are associated 
with one or more of the intellectual capital disclosure measures. This is consistent with 
Keenan and Aggestam’s (2001) argument, previously untested, that corporate governance 
impacts on efficient intellectual capital management, including its communication to 
stakeholders. The significant positive association for board composition provides 
evidence for independent directors’ function as a monitoring mechanism, which enhances 
the effectiveness of the board and reduces both agency costs and information 
asymmetries between principals and agents. Moreover, their breadth of expertise and 
knowledge heighten the board’s awareness of the importance of intellectual capital 
disclosure, especially structural and relational capital. We also find confirmation of our 
share concentration, audit committee size and frequency of audit committee meetings 
hypotheses, underpinned by agency theory arguments. Where share ownership is highly 
concentrated, smaller shareholders’ interests in relation to intellectual capital need to be 
protected via corporate governance mechanisms, such as greater independence of the 
board and larger, more active audit committees for better intellectual capital 
communication. 
We argue that, as well as the variety and volume of disclosure, it is meaningful to 
measure each firm’s disclosure focus (ICWC%) to examine the proportion of annual 
reports devoted to intellectual capital. On average, 26 per cent of annual report 
disclosures were devoted to intellectual capital; this focus is not size dependent and is 
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greater where firms have a higher proportion of independent non-executive directors and 
shareholdings are more widely spread.  
Our findings indicate that, in the absence of mandatory disclosure, effective 
corporate governance mechanisms impact positively on the variety, volume (word count) 
and format (text, numbers, graphs/pictures) of intellectual capital disclosure. Future 
research could usefully explore the relationships identified in the study in greater depth 
through organisational case studies. 
There are several limitations in this study. Firstly, the disclosure scoring sheet is 
self developed, which causes difficulty for comparison with prior studies. Secondly, the 
study focuses only on corporate annual reports and future studies may consider other 
media. Thirdly, there will be other factors that affect companies’ intellectual capital 
disclosure practices that have not been examined in this study
15
. Finally, the study has not 
attempted to include corporate culture. For example, companies that choose to have good 
disclosure policies may also choose to operate good corporate governance practices.  
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Table 1 Measurement of dependent and independent variables   
 Variable Proxy Measurement 
Dependent variables 
1 ICDI Variety of intellectual 
capital disclosure 
Number of items in the research instrument 
disclosed in the annual report divided by 183 
2 ICWC Volume of intellectual 
capital disclosure 
Total number of words disclosed in relation to 
intellectual capital information in the annual report 
3 ICWC% Focus of intellectual capital  
disclosure 
Intellectual capital disclosure word count divided 
by total word count of the annual report 
Independent variables 
Corporate governance factors 
1 Board 
composition 
Independent non-executive 
directors (INED) 
Number of independent non-executive directors on 
board (specified in the annual reports) divided by 
total number of directors on board 
2 Ownership 
structure 
Share concentration (SCON) Cumulative shareholdings by individuals or 
organisations classified as substantial shareholders 
(currently a 3% stake required by the Companies 
Act 1985), with exception of significant director’s 
shareholding, to the total number of outstanding 
common shares 
3 Internal auditing 
mechanism 
Size of audit committee 
(SAC) 
Number of directors on board in audit committee 
4 Internal auditing 
mechanism 
Frequency of audit 
committee meetings (MAC) 
Number of audit committee meetings held within 
the financial year of the annual report  
5 Role duality 
 
Combined role of Chairman 
and CEO (RDUAL) 
Dummy variable with a value of 1 if the roles of 
chairman and CEO are held by the same person 
Control Variables 
6 Length of listing 
on LSE  
Listing age (AGE) Number of days listed scaled by 365 days a year 
7 Performance: 
profitability 
Return on assets (ROA) Return / Total assets  for the financial year of the 
annual report  
8 Firm size Sales (SA) Sales revenue of financial year  
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Table 2 Correlation and partial correlation (controlling size effect- sales as a proxy) matrices 
Panel A Correlation between dependent and independent variables 
 ICDI LnICWC ICWC% INED SAC MAC SqSCON RDUAL LnAGE ROA LnSA 
ICDI 1.000                      
LnICWC 0.856***  1.000                   
ICWC% 0.500***  0.565*** 1.000                  
INED 0.340***  0.411*** 0.24** 1.000                
SAC 0.511***  0.585*** 0.175*  0.234**  1.000              
MAC 0.498***  0.528*** 0.151  0.185*  0.283***  1.000            
SqSCON -0.442***  -0.443*** -0.22** -0.173*  -0.167*  -0.179*  1.000          
LnAGE 0.119 0.163 -0.164  0.121  0.265***  0.137  -0.118  0.037  1.000      
ROA 0.205**  0.146 0.101  -0.023  0.089  0.071  -0.134  -0.109  0.216**  1.000    
LnSA 0.704***  0.693*** 0.104  0.206**  0.485***  0.510***  -0.399***  -0.182*  0.287***  0.082  1.000  
Panel B Partial correlation between dependent and independent variables controlling for size effect 
ICDI 1.000           
LnICWC 0.719***  1.000          
ICWC% 0.603***  0.688***  1.000         
INED 0.281***  0.380***  0.225**  1.000        
SAC 0.273***  0.394***  0.143 0.157 1.000       
MAC 0.228**  0.281***  0.114 0.095 0.047 1.000      
SqSCON -0.248**  -0.253**  -0.196*  -0.101 0.033 0.031 1.000     
LnAGE -0.122 -0.052 -0.204** 0.066 0.15 -0.012 -0.004 0.095 1.000   
ROA 0.208**  0.123 0.093 -0.041 0.056 0.034 -0.111 -0.096 0.201** 1.000  
 
*** = significant at .01 level, ** = significant at .05 level, * = significant at .10 level 
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Table 3 Number of companies disclosing items in the checklist under three formats
16
 
Human capital T N GP Av. WC Relational capital T N GP Av. WC Structural capital T N GP Av. WC 
Number of employees 100 99 9 101 Customers 99 82 48 965 Intellectual property 58 38 5 215 
Employee age 67 95 0 19 Market presence 92 71 26 382 Process 100 78 21 605 
Employee diversity 44 13 3 18 Customer relationships 90 47 15 295 Management philosophy 100 21 14 422 
Employee equality 92 1 0 79 Customer acquisition 78 42 6 116 Corporate culture 58 1 2 32 
Employee relationship 99 45 6 307 Customer retention 65 25 4 45 Organization flexibility 40 0 0 17 
Employee education 51 0 0 15 
Customer training & 
education 
17 1 1 9 Organization structure 89 43 9 465 
Skills/know-how 92 14 5 114 Customer involvement 18 2 1 7 Organization learning 33 0 0 26 
Employee work-related competences 100 53 0 417 
Company 
image/reputation 
65 6 12 46 Research & development 94 63 11 382 
Employee work-related knowledge 91 24 0 142 Company awards 39 2 13 47 Innovation 71 15 15 108 
Employee attitudes/ behaviour 72 15 15 63 Public relation 69 63 11 168 Technology  98 46 21 220 
Employee commitments 88 59 0 114 Diffusion & networking 47 12 3 47 Financial dealings 100 80 5 386 
Employee motivation 100 100 12 605 Brands 69 19 18 153 Customer support function 53 21 3 68 
Employee productivity 17 5 0 3 Distribution channels  50 20 5 76 
Knowledge-based 
infrastructure 
69 14 0 65 
Employee training  78 9 1 45 
Relationship with 
suppliers 
96 81 2 116 
Quality management and 
improvement 
82 13 7 87 
Vocational qualifications 10 2 0 3 Business collaboration 78 49 14 212 Accreditation (certificate)  51 7 4 57 
Employee development 95 24 4 404 Business agreements 59 34 5 198 
Overall 
infrastructure/capability 
97 62 13 272 
Employee flexibility 24 9 0 8 Favourite contract 64 45 17 237 Networking 63 4 0 23 
Entrepreneurial spirit 96 8 1 125 Research collaboration 22 6 0 26 Distribution network 65 36 12 111 
Employee capabilities 74 2 1 31 Marketing 50 21 9 73 
Employee teamwork 51 3 9 22 
Relationship with 
stakeholders 
94 42 23 623 
Employee involvement with community 46 19 3 34 Market leadership 91 35 8 154 
Other employee features  100 2 85 290 
                                                 
16 T, N, and GP represents the number of firms providing disclosure in text, numbers and graphs/pictures respectively; and Av. WC represents the average number of words disclosed by 
the sample firms. 
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics for dependent and independent variables (untransformed)
 
 
 Mean Median Min Max SD 
z-test 
Skewness 
z-test 
Kurtosis 
K-S 
Lilliefors
17
 
Dependent variables 
ICDI 0.36 0.36 0.16 0.56 0.08 0.90 -0.99 0.08 
ICWC 10488 8551 1234 51430 8901.2 9.46 12.87 0.19* 
ICWC% 0.263 0.259 0.089 0.426 0.072 0.79 -1.06 0.05 
HICDI 0.355 0.348 0.212 0.561 0.073 1.50 -0.31 0.07 
SICDI 0.371 0.370 0.130 0.574 0.092 0.07 -0.89 0.07 
RICDI 0.365 0.349 0.111 0.667 0.122 0.79 -1.14 0.08 
HICWC 2945 2558 545 8507 1598.2 3.43 0.98 0.12* 
SICWC 3551 2526 466 23648 3467.6 13.32 28.83 0.19* 
RICWC 3992 2689 223 29993 4634.6 11.99 23.27 0.24* 
HICWC% 0.083 0.080 0.033 0.174 0.026 2.28 0.61 0.08 
SICWC% 0.090 0.084 0.026 0.281 0.039 7.27 11.32 0.12* 
RICWC% 0.090 0.083 0.020 0.266 0.047 3.42 2.03 0.09 
Independent variables 
Corporate governance factors  
Board composition (%) (INED) 0.47 0.50 0.18 0.75 0.13 -0.11 -0.93 0.09 
Ownership concentration (%) 
(SCON) 
29.63 26.05 0
18
 79.2 19.55 2.19 -1.43 0.12* 
Audit committee size (Number) 
(SAC) 
3.46 3 1 7 1.06 - - - 
Audit committee meeting 
(Number) (MAC) 
3.70 4 1 9 1.41 - - - 
Role duality (RDUAL) 0.09 0 0 1 0.29 - - - 
Firm-specific factor 
Listing age (AGE) (Years) 17.15 10.69 0.45 71.87 16.71 5.99 2.58 0.19* 
Profitability (ROA) (%) 4.38 3.66 -9.53 18.67 5.79 0.03 0.54 0.09 
Firm Size (SA) £m 4036.7 383.1 0.00
19
 39792.2 8782.4 11.15 13.76 0.35* 
 
                                                 
17 * significant at the 1% level. 
18 Two companies reported that they had not been notified in accordance with sections 198 to 208 of the Companies Act 
1985 of any member who had a notifiable interest (≥3%) in the share capital of the Company. One company only has one 
significant shareholder, who sits on the board of directors, hence has no significant outside shareholding. 
19 The company is an active trading company focusing on Research and Development. Although there were no sales 
recorded during 2004 financial year, contracts were signed. 
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Table 5 Descriptive statistics for IC disclosure by category under three formats 
Intellectual capital 
categories 
Format Min Max Max possible Mean % SD 
Human capital 
Text 9 20 22 15.87 72 2.44 
Numbers 3 12 22 6 27 2.11 
Graphs/ pictures 0 8 22 1.54 7 1.33 
All 14 37 66 23.41 35 4.82 
Structural capital 
Text 5 18 18 13.21 73 2.49 
Numbers 1 12 18 5.42 30 2.30 
Graphs/ pictures 0 6 18 1.42 8 1.49 
All 7 31 54 20.05 37 4.99 
Relational capital 
Text 3 20 21 13.52 64 3.33 
Numbers 1 15 21 7.05 34 3.35 
Graphs/ pictures 0 10 21 2.41 11 2.43 
All 7 42 63 22.98 36 7.67 
Intellectual capital 
Text 19 57 61 42.6 70 7.07 
Numbers 7 38 61 17.44 29 6.95 
Graphs/ pictures 0 20 61 4.91 8 5.00 
All 29 103 183 66.44 36 15.52 
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Table 6 Multiple regression results for ICDI, LnICWC and ICWC% 
  ICDI LnICWC ICWC% 
  
Unstandardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
coefficients 
 
Unstandardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
coefficients 
 
Unstandardized 
coefficients 
Standardized 
coefficients 
 
 VIF B 
Std. 
error 
Beta t Sig. B 
Std. 
error 
Beta t Sig. B 
Std. 
error 
Beta t Sig. 
(Constant)  0.181 0.034  5.402 0.000 7.155 0.275  26.053 0.000 0.234 0.045  5.254 0.000 
SAC 1.381 0.016 0.006 0.205 2.805 0.006 0.200 0.047 0.291 4.275 0.000 0.011 0.008 0.162 1.460 0.148 
MAC 1.374 0.009 0.004 0.156 2.142 0.035 0.101 0.035 0.195 2.883 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.098 0.882 0.380 
INED 1.104 0.106 0.043 0.160 2.456 0.016 1.225 0.354 0.211 3.465 0.001 0.115 0.057 0.200 2.010 0.047 
SqSCON 1.242 -0.007 0.003 -0.162 -2.343 0.021 -0.063 0.024 -0.170 -2.633 0.010 -0.007 0.004 -0.180 -1.702 0.092 
RDUAL 1.084 -0.013 0.019 -0.045 -0.702 0.484 -0.229 0.152 -0.090 -1.501 0.137 -0.010 0.025 -0.040 -0.407 0.685 
LnAGE 1.183 -0.012 0.005 -0.155 -2.295 0.024 -0.064 0.041 -0.098 -1.552 0.124 -0.017 0.007 -0.268 -2.602 0.011 
ROA 1.084 0.002 0.001 0.149 2.309 0.023 0.009 0.008 0.071 1.171 0.245 0.002 0.001 0.119 1.212 0.229 
LnSA 1.916 0.015 0.003 0.451 5.245 0.000 0.105 0.024 0.347 4.340 0.000 -0.002 0.004 -0.077 -0.590 0.556 
R
2
 0.649 0.696 0.184 
Adj. R
2
 0.618 0.669 0.112 
Std. Error 0.051 0.418 0.068 
F Value 21.033 26.005 2.568 
Sig. F 0.000 0.000 0.014 
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Table 7 Multiple regression results for human, structural and relational capital 
disclosure based on word count 
  LnHICWC LnSICWC LnRICWC 
 VIF t Sig. t Sig. t Sig. 
(Constant)  28.717 0.000 16.177 0.000 14.041 0.000 
SAC 1.381 5.121 0.000 2.924 0.004 3.437 0.001 
MAC 1.374 2.497 0.014 2.482 0.015 2.326 0.022 
INED 1.104 1.538 0.128 3.239 0.002 2.785 0.007 
SqSCON 1.242 -1.299 0.197 -1.647 0.103 -3.272 0.002 
RDUAL 1.084 -2.030 0.045 -0.787 0.433 -1.067 0.289 
LnAGE 1.183 -2.111 0.038 -0.116 0.908 -2.045 0.044 
ROA 1.084 0.502 0.617 0.939 0.350 1.532 0.129 
LnSA 1.916 5.040 0.000 2.449 0.016 3.728 0.000 
R2 0.685 0.536 0.633 
Adjusted R2 0.657 0.495 0.601 
Std error 0.339 0.554 0.631 
F value 24.733 13.153 19.625 
Sig. F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 8 Summary of multiple regression results 
Hypotheses 
Predicted 
sign 
Actual sign 
Hypothesis support 
ICDI  
(Variety) 
LnICWC 
(Volume) 
ICWC % 
(Focus) 
Board composition (H1) + + Moderate Strong Moderate 
Role duality (H2) - - None None None 
Share concentration (H3) - - Moderate Strong Weak 
Audit committee size (H4) + + Strong Strong None 
Frequency of audit 
committee meetings (H5) 
+ + Moderate Strong None 
Listing age (H6) - - Moderate None Moderate 
ROA (H7) + + Moderate None None 
Sales (H8) + + Strong Strong None 
Strong = significant at .01 level, Moderate = significant at .05 level, Weak = significant at .10 level 
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 Appendix 1   Definition and nature of information 
Human Capital 
1 Number of 
employees 
Employee count of a firm, employee breakdown by e.g. market (business operation or geographical 
segments), department and job function, and information about its changes and reasons for such changes. 
2 Employee age Biological age of employees in the firm. Includes qualitative description of age related advantages/strengths 
of a company’s employees, and indicators such as average age of a company’s employees and age 
distribution.  
3 Employee diversity Diversity is defined as the division of classes among a certain population. The item refers to the mix of e.g. 
ethnicity, gender, colour, and sexual orientation. Relevant disclosures include employee diversity policy, the 
mix and breakdown of employee by race, religion, and culture. 
4 Employee equality Equal treatment of people irrespective of social and cultural differences. Related disclosures include employee 
equality policy and initiatives taken for enforcement, senior management by gender, and percentage of 
disabled employees. 
5 Employee 
relationship 
 
The recognition of importance of employees, employee appreciation, dependence on key employees, and 
employee satisfaction, loyalty, Health & Safety and working environment. It also includes initiatives to build 
and improve employee relationship e.g. trade union activities, promotion in share ownership and employee 
contractual relationships. 
6 Employee education Education of directors as well as other employees. Employees’ professional recognition is classified under 
employee work-related competences. 
7 Skills/know-how Disclosures can be description of knowledge, know-how, expertise or skills of directors and other employees. 
Matrixes could also be shown indicating number of employees with such skills, etc. 
8 Employee work-
related competences 
The knowledge and skills that can be useful to accomplish jobs. It refers to e.g. current positions held outside 
the company by directors, professional recognition/qualification, awards won (external), and employee 
publications. 
9 Employee work-
related knowledge 
What is acquired during the job in terms of tacit, explicit and implicit knowledge. It mainly relates to 
knowledge that employees have related to their current job description, including employee previous working 
experiences. 
10 Employee attitudes/ 
behaviour 
It reflects how employees are working. Relevant disclosures could be e.g. employee friendliness, welcoming, 
hard working, optimism, enthusiasm, and identification of individuals with company’s goals. 
11 Employee 
commitments 
It refers to employees being bounds emotionally/intellectually to the organisation. It covers e.g. description of 
employee commitments, employee commitment matrix/index, and indicators such as attendance of meetings. 
12 Employee motivation Policies, initiatives and evidence of motivation of directors and other employees. It includes reward (internal) 
and incentives systems, e.g. employee explicit recognition, performance/psychometric/occupational 
assessment, and indicators of such as employee turnover20, stability, absence, and seniority.  
13 Employee 
productivity21 
It is typically measured as output per employee or output per labour-hour, an output which could be measured 
in physical terms or in price terms. It shows the value added and efficiency of employees. Indicators include 
e.g. employee value added, revenue or customers per employee. 
14 Employee training  It includes e.g. training policies, training programmes, training time, attendance, investment in training, 
number of employees trained per period, and training results/effectiveness/efficiency. 
15 Vocational 
qualifications 
It refers to education, managed and monitored by trade and professional organisations (Brooking, 1996), 
received by an employee for a particular vocation that proves the skill, knowledge and understanding he/she 
has to do a job well.  
16 Employee 
development 
Employee career development. Disclosures includes employee development policies and programmes (e.g. 
succession planning), recruitment policies (e.g. internal promotion). Indicators include change of employee 
seniority, and rate of internal promotion. 
17 Employee 
flexibility22 
Strategies used by employers to adapt the work of employees to their production/business cycles; and a 
method to enable workers to adjust working life and working hours to their own preferences. E.g. 
temporary/fixed-term contracts, relaxed hiring and firing regulations, adjustable working hours or schedules 
(e.g. part-time, flexible working hours/shifts, working time accounts, leaves, and over-time), outsourcing, job 
rotation, tele/home-workers, outworkers.  
18 Entrepreneurial spirit It refers to e.g. employee engagement (e.g. employee suggestion systems/consultations, rate of employee 
suggestions acceptance), empowerment (responsibility taking), creativity (e.g. valuing creativity, tolerance of 
                                                 
20 Information about directors’ retirement is not included as employee turnover. 
21 Directors’ achievements based on incentive schemes are classified as employee motivation information rather than employee productivity. 
It is considered more appropriate to reflect on the motivational effectiveness of incentive schemes. 
22 Not formal qualifications as degrees. 
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creative people), innovativeness, knowledge sharing, and employee proactive/reactive ability.  
19 Employee 
capabilities 
Other employee abilities apart from the above discussed, e.g. communication ability, interpersonal ability, 
sensitivity (e.g. thoughtful), reflexibility, and management quality. 
20 Employee teamwork Teamwork is the concept of people working together cooperatively. It covers information about culture of 
teamwork (expert teams and networks, teamwork capacity), programmes that enhance relationships between 
employees within/ across departments. 
21 Employee 
involvement with 
community 
Employee social competence can be reflected by their involvement with community. It is defined as 
providing employees opportunities for contact with an often concealed but significant part of the firm’s 
stakeholders. 
22 Other employee 
features 
It refers to the special display or attraction of, or give special prominence to employees of the firm, e.g. 
photographs of employees, other employee profile information (e.g. positions held). 
Structural Capital 
1 Intellectual property It is a term that encompasses patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, licenses, commercial rights and 
other related fields. It covers the assets of a company which is protected by law.  
2 Process It normally refers to a company’s management (sales tools, company co-operation forms, corporate 
specialisation, operational or administrative processes). It includes utilisation of organisation resources, 
processes/ procedures / routines, and documentations which enables the company or employees to follow. 
Indicators are e.g. efficiency, effectiveness, and productivity. 
3 Management 
philosophy 
“The way leaders in the firm think about the firm and its employees” (Brooking, 1996: 62), i.e. the way a 
firm’s managed.  
4 Corporate culture The set of key values, beliefs, attitudes and understanding shared by people and groups in an organisation, 
which controls the way members of the organisation interact with each other and with other stakeholders. It 
covers information about e.g. description of the firm’s corporate culture and value, stories and myths that 
build up about people, events and history conveying a message about what is valued within a firm. 
5 Organization 
flexibility 
A company’s ability to face challenges and changes, such as specific processes firms use to alter their 
resource base.  
6 Organization 
structure 
Reporting lines, hierarchies, and the way that work flows through the business, including such as management 
structure, business models.  
7 Organization learning A characteristic of an adaptive organisation. It covers what firms learn from experience and incorporate the 
learning as feedback into their planning process.  
8 Research & 
development (R&D) 
It refers to future-oriented, longer-term activities in business practice, which can achieve higher levels of 
knowledge and improvement in business practice, allowing the organisation to exploit competitive 
advantages. It includes e.g. R&D policies, programmes, planning, progress, budgets, successful rate, rate of 
peer-reviewed publications.  
9 Innovation Defined as the successful implementation of creative ideas within a firm by introducing something new and 
useful (radical or incremental changes to products, processes or services). 
10 Technology A collection of techniques, which is the current state of humanity’s knowledge of how to combine resources 
to produce desired products, to solve problems, fulfil needs, or satisfy wants. It includes such as machines, IT 
(e.g. computer hardware and software), IS (e.g. SAP, PeopleSoft, database), technical methods, and 
techniques.  
11 Financial dealings Defined as the favourable relationships the firm has with investors, banks and other financiers, financial 
ratings; financial facilities available; and listings. 
12 Customer support 
function 
Functions for customer support, such as customer support centres (e.g. call centres) and other related 
activities and programmes. 
13 Knowledge-based 
infrastructure 
It includes e.g. documented materials (e.g. shared database) that a firm shares amongst employees, facilities 
or centres (knowledge centres, laboratories) for training & learning, and knowledge management and sharing 
programmes/policies/facilities. 
14 Quality management 
& improvement 
Practices in maintaining and improving quality standards of products and services. Information considered 
relevant includes e.g. policies and objectives, programmes, control activities (e.g. TQM), description of 
quality performance, and existence of quality committee. 
15 Accreditations 
(certificate)  
A process in which certification of competency, authority, or credibility is presented. It has been broadly 
referred to quality certificates. “Investor in people” accreditation represents a firm’s commitment to its 
employees; hence were classified under employee relationship. 
16 Overall 
infrastructure/ 
capability 
Infrastructure/capabilities of a firm that cannot be classified under the other 17 structural capital items. Where 
acquisitions are stated to add a firm’s capability of products and services provision, such information is 
included under this item. 
17 Networking The systems available in a firm that allows interaction of people via a broad array of communication media 
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and devices, e.g. voicemail, e-mail, voice or video conferencing, the internet, groupware and corporate 
intranets, personal digital assistants, and newsletters. 
18 Distribution network Internal networks of distribution, such as distribution centres. It is what a company owns and form a very 
essential part of the business supply chain. 
Relational Capital 
1 Customers General customer information, e.g. type of customers; customer names; reputation of customers; customer 
base; knowledge of markets/customers; and customer purchasing histories.  
2 Market presence It covers target markets of a firm, geographically or by market segmentation; percentage of sales represented 
by each market segment; and market share.  
3 Customer 
relationships 
It includes policies and programmes for building customer relationships (e.g. customer loyalty schemes, 
customer satisfaction survey and the initiatives taken for improvement, complaints management), current 
relationships with customers (e.g. customer satisfaction and loyalty, customer recommendation, recognition 
of dependence on key customers, customer perception [e.g. expressed by direct quotes], and various 
activities/indicators that enhance customer relationships, such as on-time deliveries, convenience of returning 
goods, value for money).  
4 Customer acquisition It refers to a company’s new customers/contracts (unless identified as favourite contracts). It also includes a 
company’s effort on acquiring new or more customers, such as investments/costs.  
5 Customer retention It focuses on retaining the existing customers. Relevant information includes e.g. the number of repeated 
customers/contracts, renewed contracts, backlog orders, and customer repurchase. 
6 CTE Customer training & education (CTE), such as presentation, road shows, exhibitions, etc. 
7 Customer 
involvement 
It focuses on customer consultation on product or services development, which could also include customer 
& the company connectivity. 
8 Company Image/ 
reputation 
It refers to the evaluation/perception of a firm by its stakeholders in terms of their affect, esteem, and 
knowledge, and what a company stand for.  
9 Company awards It includes awards to a company which is not specifically to other aspects, such as innovation or employees.  
10 Public relation 
 
It is the managing of outside communication of an organisation to create and maintain a positive image. 
Public relations involve e.g. popularising successes and downplaying failures.  
11 Diffusion & 
networking 
It includes relates to taking part in social events, courses, conferences, lectures, or other presentations or 
seminars.  
12 Brands23 Information about e.g. brand names, brand images, brand awareness, brand loyalty (e.g. word of mouth 
advocacy), brand building strategies and activities, and brand related sales. 
13 Distribution channels Defined as appropriate mechanisms of getting products and services into the market (Brooking, 1996). It 
refers to various third party distribution channels, e.g. distributors, agents, dealers.  
14 Relationship with 
suppliers 
It includes e.g. knowledge of suppliers, relationships with them (such as reliance on key suppliers, bargaining 
power against suppliers, support of suppliers, and payment terms). 
15 Business 
collaboration 
Collaborations established with other business partners. It covers issues such as strategic alliances, joint 
venture and partnership for the purpose of working together to improve effectiveness and efficiency by 
combining each other’s advantages. 
16 Business agreements It includes such as licensing and franchising agreements. However, the transactions are not within a 
consolidated group of companies.  
17 Favourite contract A contract obtained because of the unique market position held by the firm (Brooking, 1996). It includes 
description of the contract and the favourable relationships. 
18 Research 
collaboration 
Collaborations with scientific associations or institutions (e.g. schools and universities) for research or 
development purposes for the benefit of the company or the community.  
19 Marketing It includes e.g. marketing initiatives, investments, strategies, capabilities, and effects (e.g. awareness raised or 
sales created). 
20 Relationship with 
stakeholders 
A firm’s relationship with stakeholders, which cannot be covered by relationship with customers, suppliers 
and shareholders, e.g. community, government, and competitors.  
21 Market leadership A firm’s leadership in various markets or top positions. Market share supplementing market leadership 
statement is also included.  
  
                                                 
23 Brands have been classified under relational capital in various studies (e.g. Bozzolan et al., 2003; Brennan, 2001; Guthrie and Petty, 2000). 
Although authors such as Rodgers (2003) consider brands as a structural capital item, it is considered in this study that brands themselves 
are not able to create value for firms and it is the attachment of the market and customers, and the positive perception consumers have 
relating to the brand that lead to purchase decisions and add value to the firm. 
